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t
INCENTIVE
EFFECTSOF MEDICALMALPRACTICE

The Effects of Malpractice Litigation
on Physicians' Fees and Incomes
By PATRICIA M. DANZON, MARK V. PAULY, AND RAYNARD S. KINGTON*
payment were $18,000 and $80,741, respectively. There remain large differences among
states and among specialties in claim frequency and severity.

For many years physicians and other medical providers in the United States have been
subject to a negligence rule of liability. Under a negligence rule, patients who suffer an
adverse outcome are entitled to compensation if they can show that they incurred an
injury that was caused by the physician's
failure to take due care, defined as departure
from the customary standard of care of
physicians in good standing in the profession. The traditional tort standard of damages is full compensation for monetary and
nonmonetary loss.
There have been no major doctrinal shifts
in the law expanding liability for medical
malpractice over the last decade-indeed,
many states have enacted tort reforms designed to reduce the number and size of
claims. Nevertheless, from 1975 to 1984,
claims per physician rose at an average rate
of 10 percent a year; between 1982 and 1986
claim frequency per 100 physicians rose from
13.5 to 17.2 a year. (See Danzon, 1988, and
sources cited therein.) Claim severity (average amount per paid claim) increased at
roughly twice the rate of the CPI from 1975
to 1984. In 1984, the median and mean

Costs of malpracticeinsurancehave also
increased dramatically,but more erratically
than claims costs. Followingthe malpractice
"crisis" of the mid-1970s, when rates increased by over 300 percent in a single year
in some states, rates remained stable or actually fell in the late 1970s, but resumed an
upward trend in the 1980s. Between 1977
and 1984, rates for basic limits of coverage

increasedby 109 percentfor the lowest-risk
specialists, such as GPs doing no surgery,

180 percent for obstetricians,and 189 percent for the highest-risksurgicalspecialists.
Althoughmalpracticeinsuranceis still less
than 2 percent of total health care expenditures, many observers argue that medical

malpracticeis a majorfactorcontributingto
rising health care costs. One implicationof
such argumentsis that virtuallyall the cost
is borne by patients.This seemsat odds with
argumentsmade by others,that a significant
fractionof physiciansare givingup practice,
or at least high-risk procedures, because of
liability.
Full and automatic pass-through of costs
is also potentially at odds with the deterrent
purposes of the negligence rule of liability,
which is to correct the potential underprovision of care in a market with asymmetric
information and systematic underestimate of
risk by consumers. With a shift from no
liability to a perfect negligence system, we
might observe an increase in preventive measures by physicians, an increase in prices,
and an increase in gross revenues. This would
occur if patients perceived the improvement
in quality and valued it at cost, and the
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system had been nonoptimal without liability-but nonoptimality is inconsistent with
fully informed patients.' With imperfect information on the part of courts, liability
insurers, and consumers, the incidence and
incentive effects of the tort system are uncertain a priori and become an empirical question.
In this paper we discuss some of the theoretical and empirical issues in estimating the
effects of malpractice litigation on physicians' fees and incomes and summarize some
new empirical estimates.
I. Effectsof Malpractice
on PhysicianPricingin the ShortRun
Assume that cross-sectional differences
and the intertemporal increase in claim frequency and severity reflect changes in the
legal system that increase the probability
and expected size of a malpractice recovery
for the plaintiff, conditional on the occurrence of an injury.2 Let us characterize
the "generosity" of the legal regime by an
index J.
Malpractice litigation creates two types of
cost for physicians: the cost of claims and
legal defense that can be covered by insurance; and the cost of own time in claim
defense, loss of reputation, anxiety, etc. that
are uninsurable. Under current methods of
rating malpractice insurance, the cost of insurance depends on the physician's specialty,
limits of coverage, whether or not certain
high-risk procedures are performed at all
(for example, any surgery by GPs, obstetrics

1If patients perceive the average quality of care but
not the care of individual physicians, then full passthrough of the costs of additional care under a perfect
negligence rule may be possible, even though market
forces alone would create suboptimal incentives for
care.
2For an analysis of the effects of legal, medical, and
demographic factors on the frequency and severity of
malpractice claims by state, see Danzon (1984; 1986).
California data for 1974 indicate that, at most, 1 in 10
injuries due to negligence led to a claim and 1 in 25
received compensation. Thus some increase in claim
frequency is possible without assuming a change in the
rate of negligence or a proplaintiff shift in the law.
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by OB/GYNs) and the decisionto practice
full or part-time.Given these basic practice
choices, the premiumis a fixed cost, independent of numberof patientcontacts.3The
uninsured costs are a marginalper patient
cost equal to the expectedcost if sued. This
marginalcost increaseswith claimfrequency
and severity. On the other hand, if physicians maximizeutility ratherthan profit,an
increase in premiumsthat reduces net income should lower the physician'simplicit
opportunitycost of time, assumingleisureis
a normalgood. In that case, an increasein J
should lower marginalcost. An increasein J
may also affect patients'demandfor care,if
patientsperceiveand valueany risk-reducing
measures taken by physicians, or if they
perceiveand valueany increasein the probability or amountof compensationif injured.
How does an increasein J affect physicians' prices and net incomes?Considerthe
simple case where firm-leveldemandis not
affectedby changesin potentialmalpractice
awards and the physician-firmis a profit
maximizer operating in a monopolistically
competitive market (Pauly and Mark Satterthwaite,1981). Furtherassumethat longrun equilibriumrequiresthe equalizationof
(real) net incomes acrossmarketareas.
We considertwo basic modelsof the process of adjustment to market equilibrium
following an increasein J. At one extreme,
physicians simply purchasehigher limits of
coveragebut do not otherwisechange their
practice patterns.There is full incidenceof
the increasedinsuranceand uninsuredcosts
on physiciansand hencea sharpreductionin
net incomes and even larger reduction in
utility. This would be a short-runequilibrium if physiciansare profitmaximizersand
the changes in premiumsare viewed as a
fixed cost.

3Although explicit experience rating is not widespread, implicit experience rating occurs because physicians with very poor claims records may face restrictions on their practice or be denied coverage by more
selective insurers who charge lower premiums. Periods
of sharply rising premiums marketwide are usually accompanied by a tightening of underwriting standards.
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In long-runequilibrium,stable differences
in J must be reflectedeitherin price levels
or in differencesin "quality"that are cost
saving to physicians,assumingequalization
of (real) net income per physician across
market areas. Physician migration is expected to be the primaryequilibratingdevice
in this firstmodel if premiumsare treatedas
a fixed cost by individualprofit-maximizing
physicians and increasesin malpracticelitigation do not raise marginalcosts due to
(implicit)expecteduninsuredcosts.
In the second model,an increasein J does
significantly raise physicians' perceived
marginal costs and trigger an increase in
prices in the short run that could exceed the
increasein marginalcost.4Assumingthat the
marketfor physicians'servicesis monopolistically competitive, the profit-maximizing

level is a reasonableconjecturefor physician
servicesmarkets.
There are alternative assumptions that
would yield the same short-runeffect on
price. The physician servicesmarketmight
be characterizedas oligopolistic,and the increase in fixed costs might be used as a
signal to raise prices.Alternatively,if insurers rapidly and automaticallyincorporate
premiumcost increasesinto theirreimbursement levels, institutionalmechanismscould
facilitate a rapid adjustmentin fee levels
such that physician incomes are protected
from even short-runincidenceand there is
no strong stimulus to adjustmentof physician stocks.

change in price is

The data used in this study are from the
1976, 1978, and 1983 surveysof Physicians'
Practice Costs and Incomes (PPCI), conducted for the Health Care FinancingAdministration.Each of these surveysoccurred
at a differentpoint in the malpracticeinsurance "cycle." The 1976 survey follows two
years of rapidlyrisingpremiumrates;in the
two years prior to the 1978 survey, rates
were flat or falling. Beginningin 1980, rates
then began to rise again.5These data permit
both cross-sectional and time-series (first
difference) analysis of the relationshipbetween physicians'fees, reimbursement
levels,
and incomes,on the one hand,and measures
of the malpracticeclimateon the other.
We use threemeasuresof the "malpractice
climate": state-level claim frequency per
physician,state-levelclaim severity(average
payment per paid claim), and the rate
chargedby the leadingmalpracticeinsurerin
the state for basic limits coverage.This rate
is not a fully accuratemeasureof the relevant price of insurancebecausethe majority
of physiciansbuy excess limits of coverage,
for which rates are nonlinear,but fairlyuniform across states. Claim frequency is a

(1) dP/dJ= [dMC/dJ ][1+(1,/ED)f1
where MC is marginalcost and ED is the
firm-level price elasticity of demand, assumed constant.Pricemay increaseby more
or less than MC depending on ED. For
example, using Thomas McCarthy's(1985)
rough estimateof -3 for demandelasticity,
price will rise by 3/2 times any increasein
marginalcost. However,if demandbecomes
more elastic as price rises (for example,if
demandis linear),then pricemay rise by an
amount less than or equal to marginalcost.
But, if the increasein J affectsall physicians in an area equally,then the final effect
on prices and incomes depends on market
demand, not the individual firm demand
elasticity. If the marketdemandelasticityis
low, the final outcomecan be an increasein
price with minimal reduction in quantity,
almost no change in gross or net income,
and hence almost no migration.This combination of relatively elastic demand at the
firmlevel but inelasticdemandat the market

4Another alternative not addressed here is that physician outflow may reduce physician inputs and quality
per unit of output, or some combination of price increases and quality decreases.

II. Data

5The later 1986 PPCI survey follows the very sharp
premium increases of the mid-1980s, but unfortunately
does not contain data on prices.
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proxy for the uninsuredtime costs of being
sued. Potential claim severity would be a
measureof exposurein excessof basiclimits,
but is imperfectly measured by observed
severity because the latter tends to be inversely correlated with claim frequency.
Controlling for claim frequencyand claim
severity,the premiumrate is a proxy for the
loading charge for claim defense, administration, and profit, and any discrepancybetween prior claim frequency and severity
and expected future claim costs. Since all
three measuresare potentialproxiesfor differentdimensionsof the malpracticeclimate,
all three are includedin the empiricalanalysis reported here. An alternative specification uses the individualphysician'sactual expenditure on malpractice insurance,
treatedas endogenous.The analysiscontrols
for otherrelevantmarketareacharacteristics
that are expected to affect physicians'fees
and incomes.
III. EmpiricalResults:
A. Cross Section

In all three years, the cross-sectionevidence shows a strong positive relationship
between the various measuresof the malpracticeclimate and physicians'fees (Table
1).6 The elasticitywith respectto the physician's(endogenous)expenditureon malpractice insuranceis roughly.16 for office visit
fees, and between .09 and .17 for hospital
visit fees. The patternacrossyears does not
support the hypothesisof delayed response
of fees. This hypothesis would predict a
largerpositiverelationshipbetweenfees and
rates in 1978 (when physicianshad several
years to adjust prices to the sharp rate increases in 1974-76) than in 1976 or 1983
which immediatelyfollowed sharp rate increases. Controllingfor the rate for basic
limits coverage,high claimseverityis associated with higherfees, whereasthe coefficient
on claim frequencyis generallynegativeor

6Full equations are reported in our 1990 paper.

TABLE 1-CROSS-SECTION RELATIONSHIP
MEASURES
BETWEENMALPRACTICE
AND FEES

Variable

1976

1978

A. Dependent variable: Usual charge
for office visit (Ln)
0.103
0.105
RATE (Ln)
(10.22) (10.49)
CLAIM
0.028
0.040
SEVERITY (Ln)
(3.47)
(1.88)
CLAIM
0.003
-0.006
FREQUENCY
(0.80)
(-1.70)

1983

0.113
(6.74)
0.022
(2.14)
-0.113
(-3.16)

0.165
(9.52)

0.176
(6.52)

B. Dependent variable: Usual charge
for hospital follow-up visit (Ln)
0.047
0.039
RATE (Ln)
(3.71)
(2.98)
CLAIM
0.060
0.087
SEVERITY (Ln)

0.110
(4.46)

(4.23)

(3.91)

(0.99)

0.014
(2.91)
0.140
(5.98)

0.01
(2.12)
0.085
(3.96)

0.016
(0.31)
0.173
(4.59)

PREMIUMa (Ln)

CLAIM
FREQUENCY
PREMIUMa (Ln)

0.155
(8.82)

0.015

Note: Regression coefficients and t-statistics are shown
in parentheses.
aTwo-stage least squares.

insignificantfor officevisit fees, and positive
for hospitalvisit fees.
The magnitude of the price elasticities
suggestsmore thana full pass-throughof the
costs of insurance.Thereare severalpossible
explanationsfor this. First,as discussedearlier, an increasein marginalcost can result
increasein price
in a more-than-proportional
if marketdemandis inelasticand physicians
monopolisticcomact as profit-maximizing
petitors,or if third-partypayersrapidlyadjust reimbursementrates, as they appearto
have done. Second, if physiciansare utility
maximizersand derive significantnegative
utility from the threat of being sued, they
would requirepositivecompensatingincome
differentialsto remain in practice.A third
possibility is an increasein "quality,"such
as time per visit. Preliminaryanalysis does
show some evidence of increasedtime per
visit. .
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The elasticities of usual reimbursement
paid by "the highest paying" Blue Shield
and commercial insurer in the area and by
Medicare are broadly similar to the elasticities for physicians' usual charges. However,
the ability to pass-through malpractice costs
to Medicaid reimbursement is more limited
and appears to diminish over time, with a
negative relationship by 1983. This is consistent with the general tightening of Medicaid
limits on physician reimbursement in the
1980s.
When the sample is pooled across specialties, the relationship between malpractice
variables and net incomes is consistently
positive, although weaker in 1983 than in the
earlier years. This effect largely disappears
when the data are disaggregated by specialty, suggesting that pooling across specialties induces a spurious positive correlation
between net income and the specialty-specific
malpractice rate, even with specialty dummies included in the estimating equation.
These cross-sectional results are consistent
with a model of the adjustment process in
which there are significant positive and rapid
adjustments in prices and reimbursement
levels, and no significant negative effects on
net income.
B. Time-Series
To distinguish between the models of adjustment via changes in physician stocks, on
the one hand, and rapid adjustment of prices
on the other hand, we performed two types
of tests. First, we reestimated the cross-section equations treating county-level physician stocks as endogenous. The results were
essentially unchanged. We also tested for the
effect of changes in the malpractice variables
on changes in physician stocks, and found
no significant effects. Doctors did not leave
(or choose to avoid) states whose malpractice climates worsened, relative to other
states.
Second, we examined the relationship between changes in our measures of the malpractice threat and the contemporaneous
change in net incomes, prices, and hours
over the seven-year period, 1976-1983. Since
the individual physician data are not in the

MA Y 1990

form of a panel, we cannot examine first
differences at the level of the individual
practice. Instead, we calculate sample average values for observations grouped into the
72 malpractice insurance rating territories,
and take first differences in those averages.
Because the sample number of physicians
per territory varies, results are reported using means weighted by the number of physicians in the territory. To control for changes
in other area characteristics that might affect
fee levels, we include the change in the predicted value of Medicare prevailing charges
for four physician services: GP office visits
and hospital visits, hysterectomies, and cholecsystectomies. Because of the exploratory
nature of this analysis, we discuss the results
of stepwise analysis, with a selection significance level of 0.15.
The first difference in malpractice premium rates is positively associated with the
change in average fees for office visits and
for follow-up hospital visits, with significance at better than the 0.1 level. Other
significant covariates of fee changes have the
expected signs. None of the malpractice variables was significant in explaining the change
in net income or changes in insurers' reimbursement rates. For the 1976-78 period,
during which malpractice premiums generally fell, the positive association between the
malpractice variables and fees did not hold,
suggesting that even if fees adjust rapidly
upward, they are sticky downward. There
was also no evidence of income decline associated with the malpractice variables.
In conclusion, the evidence from the
1976-83 period is consistent with the increase in malpractice costs being passed on
fairly rapidly in higher fees, with little negative effect on physician net incomes on average or adjustment in physician stocks across
market areas. We emphasize that these conclusions are based on data that predate the
sharp increase in malpractice premiums in
the mid-1980s. The pass-through of these
later cost increases may have been much less
rapid because of the more competitive market for physician services and more aggressive cost-control practices of third-party
payers. Second, finding no evidence of effects on mean net incomes does not preclude
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significant effects for individualphysicians
and adjustmentof physicianstocks or service flows within insuranceratingterritories.
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